Confrontation vs. Consensus

For the past few years, China-U.S. diplomatic relations appear to have become a zero-sum game – a process in which each side looked for a “winner take all” victory over the other. As each side became more entrenched, each defined the other as the “enemy”. 

To be sure, each side had its reasons. The U.S. sees China’s expansion, development of a global military reach, and its public diplomacy through the Belt and Road Initiative as a threat to liberal democracy and to its geopolitical interests. It sees China’s use of technological warfare as inimical to its interests, China’s attempts to control and intimidate overseas Chinese abhorrent and to interfere in foreign elections as unacceptable. 

China sees the U.S. sanctions against access to technology, demands that China respect human rights and the global rules-based trading system, as well as cease support for Russia in Ukraine as attempts to circumscribe China’s ability to grow under its own system based on its own values and interests.

According to both sides, relations were at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. Trying to paint one another into a corner appeared to be leading to greater confrontation.

Painting your adversary into a corner is often a recipe for disaster. 

On the Chinese side, under President Xi it has increasingly flexed its economic muscle and asserted itself. This has led to confrontation over Taiwan, and other claims of sovereignty over a number of Pacific islands and maritime economic zones. With its newfound power, the ongoing pressure from the West has put China into a corner where it cannot allow itself to appear weak. This is resulting in greater militarization of the region.

On the U.S. side, concern over Chinese ambitions and actions has led to a nuclear submarine alliance between Australia, the U.S. the U.K. and recently, France. The plan is to build and deliver a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine for their respective navies. 

Fortunately for the international community, the U.S. and China now appear to be establishing a dialogue of sorts at very senior levels. In June, Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited and met with President Xi and China’s Foreign Minister. While no real agreement was reached on any issue, there was a feeling on both sides that the talks were productive and appeared to ratchet down some of the tension.

The Guardian describes the talks as “candid, substantive and constructive” although they did not appear to make concrete progress on disputes that include Taiwan, trade, human rights and fentanyl. Both expressed a desire to stabilise ties despite what one US official called their “profound” differences, and agreed that Qin would visit Washington to continue the conversation, though no date was announced.

This month, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen visited China and held broad discussions with her Chinese counterparts. Hours before Ms. Yellen’s news conference, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, issued a report on her visit that described the talks as constructive but also reiterated what China sees as key areas of dispute. The report expressed China’s continued objections to the Biden administration’s emphasis on preserving American national security through trade restrictions.

“China believes that generalizing national security is not conducive to normal economic and trade exchanges,” China’s national news agency Xinhua said. “The Chinese side expressed concern about U.S. sanctions and restrictive measures against China.”

President Biden has invited President Xi to attend the APEC summit in San Francisco in November and will likely meet at the G-20 Summit in New Delhi in September.

This is all encouraging. As Winston Churchill once said, “better “jaw-jaw” than “war-war””.

But putting all of the eggs in one basket complicates negotiations and the resolution of separate problems as envisaged by both parties.

I am reminded that in the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 between all European states (except for Albania and Andorra), Canada and the U.S., signatories agreed to create four “baskets” of issues that they believed could be managed separately to ensure progress on issues that could be resolved while not creating an all or nothing approach that would stifle ongoing dialogue.

This type of arrangement might work for the U.S. and China, as different issues are addressed at different speeds, and progress on some issues can be forthcoming without falling victim to failures on others.

The relationship is complex, and addressing the various issues will also be complicated. 

But this is a start, and I look forward to seeing where the dialogue will lead.

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Edition: Estefanía Cardeña